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Markets for transferring catastrophic risk in agriculture are sorely lacking in developing
countries. Even in developed countries, markets for transferring the risk of crop losses caused
by natural hazards generally exist only with large government subsidies. However, such
subsidies can be expensive, ineﬃcient, and have detrimental implications that make future
catastrophes even worse (Barnett, 1999). In developing countries ﬁscal constraints limit the
degree to which governments can subsidize markets for agricultural risk-sharing. Nonetheless,
there are speciﬁc things that governments can do to facilitate the development of these
markets. This paper addresses the role of government in agricultural risk-sharing for natural
disasters that impact crop yields or livestock mortality.
Governments that are concerned about economic eﬃciency should be extremely cautious
about making public investments in agricultural risk-sharing markets. International expe-
rience demonstrates that, through rent-seeking activities, market participants can continue
capturing public resources well beyond the start up phase of these markets. To the extent
possible, government investments in developing agricultural risk-sharing markets should also
have minimal impacts on resource allocation decisions of farmers and rural decision-makers.
Many countries have invested public resources in developing and maintaining insurance
products that protect farmers against yield, price, or revenue risks. However, governments
should only choose to invest public resources in developing agricultural insurance if it is
perceived that the social costs of ineﬃciencies caused by the lack of such insurance products
outweigh the social costs of government intervention. These social costs would include not
only the opportunity costs of public resources required to create and maintain the agricultural
insurance products but also any resource allocation distortions that result from farmers and
rural decision-makers responding to incentives created by the insurance products.
Governments often consider investments in agricultural insurance markets as an alterna-
tive to ex post free disaster assistance. Often times, these government investments include
signiﬁcant premium subsidies for insured farmers. In principal, insurance products with ex
ante structured rules have many advantages over ex post disaster assistance that is subject to
budget constraints and the politics of the day. However, if premium subsidies are very high,
an insurance product can generate many of the same perverse incentives as ex post disaster
assistance. Further, the details of how any premium subsidy is structured are critical.
In general, there is no “one-size-ﬁts-all” policy recommendation for the role of govern-
ment in agricultural risk management. We assume that most governments consider at least
three criteria when considering alternatives for addressing agricultural risk management
needs. These are: 1) ﬁscal constraint; 2) social relief for serious catastrophes; and 3) a desireto facilitate more market-oriented risk transfer. To that end, we stress the importance of
identifying risk layers and constructing appropriate government roles for each of those risk
layers. In so doing, governments can attempt to segregate social welfare programs that use
public funds to respond to low probability, high magnitude events from more market-based
insurance programs that can be facilitated with less government ﬁscal exposure, making cer-
tain that these two forms of government intervention are complementary and not working
at cross purposes.
In assessing proper roles for government, one must ﬁrst consider the economic beneﬁts
that can be created by risk management tools, the characteristics of risks faced by farmers
in the area, and the challenges associated with creating and maintaining risk management
tools such as insurance.
2 The Case for Insurance Markets
Risk-averse decision-makers are willing to purchase risk transfer instruments (such as insur-
ance) even when they have to pay more for the instrument than they expect to receive in
payouts. Those who can transfer some portion of their risk exposure, through mechanisms
like insurance, are more likely to engage in productive activities that promise high returns
but also high risk. Thus, eﬀective risk transfer markets encourage investment in productive
activities with subsequent economic beneﬁts for producers and local communities (Arrow,
1996).
However, beyond the market growth arguments that can be made for risk transfer, it is
also likely that risk markets can help the poor. Climatic risks present major problems for poor
farmers around the world. Not only do they retard growth by discouraging investment, but
they can also trap individuals in poverty as a major weather shock can disrupt progress being
made by individual households that are just beginning to escape the grips of poverty. The
literature that describes the link between risk and poverty traps is growing (e.g., Dercon’s
edited book Insurance Against Poverty).
Farmers face crop losses due to drought, pests, ﬂoods, frosts, ﬁre, and other hazards. Of
these, drought and other weather-driven risk are the most dominant. Dercon (2002) reports
that nearly 80% of Ethiopian farmers cited harvest failure due to drought, ﬂoods or frost
as their most common concern. Dercon (2005a) has numerous chapters that demonstrate a
strong link between shocks and poverty. Increasingly studies are ﬁnding that many of the poor
in developing countries are a transitory group that move in and out of poverty on a regular
basis. Shocks from a wide range of risk related events stop progress and send households
who are making progress back to the poverty ranks. These poverty traps justify some type
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protection may well be good for growth.” [page 2, Dercon (2005b)].
3 Agricultural Risk and Risk Management
Agricultural producers are susceptible to a variety of risks. Among these are variations in
market prices for agricultural commodities and production inputs. Agricultural producers
are also exposed to production risks associated with adverse weather conditions and pests.
The primary focus of this paper is crop yield risk (rather than price risk). Much of the
discussion is also applicable to situations where extreme weather events, such as drought or
very harsh winter conditions, result in high rates of death loss for livestock.
Farmers use a variety of strategies to address the ﬁnancial implications of risk. In general,
these strategies can be classiﬁed in three categories: risk mitigation, risk transfer, and man-
agement of retained risk. Common risk mitigation strategies include irrigation, integrated
pest management systems, the adoption of risk-reducing technologies such as pesticides or
improved seed varieties, and diversiﬁcation across commodities, regions, and/or oﬀ-farm
enterprises.
In developed countries farmers often have access to risk transfer mechanisms such as
futures market contracts (or derivatives thereof) to help manage price risk and crop insurance
to help manage yield risk. In the developing world, the availability of risk transfer mechanisms
is generally much more limited and informal. Share tenancy is perhaps the most commonly
used risk transfer mechanism in many developing countries.
Even if they utilize available risk mitigation and/or risk transfer mechanisms, farmers
still retain some degree of risk exposure. Thus, they must utilize strategies for managing the
ﬁnancial implications of serious loss events. Typically, this involves mechanisms for smooth-
ing inter-temporal consumption across low and high income periods. In developed countries
this is often accomplished by maintaining credit reserves with formal lending institutions.
Individuals in some developing countries have access to formal lending institutions though
often traditional local money-lenders are more common. Consumption smoothing can also
occur through the assistance of extended family and community networks.
In developing countries, spatially correlated risk exposure creates a signiﬁcant challenge
since participants in consumption smoothing mechanisms often come from the same region or
even the same village (Anderson, 1976). In the wake of a spatially correlated loss event, such
as a drought, the demand for credit will increase dramatically driving up interest rates in
rudimentary, highly localized, credit markets. In many cultures, villages are organized along
extended family networks so a spatially correlated loss event will simultaneously impact all
3individuals and put tremendous strains on informal assistance networks. If the risk associated
with spatially correlated loss events can be transferred out of the region, local consumption
smoothing mechanisms will function more eﬀectively.
4 Risk Transfer and Insurability Conditions
In some economic sectors, insurance is a commonly used risk transfer mechanism. Through-
out the developed world, and in many developing countries, insurance is available to protect
against the ﬁnancial implications of events such as automobile accidents, theft, and property
damage caused by ﬁre or wind. When purchasing an insurance policy, individuals choose to
accept a relatively small, consistent stream of losses (the insurance premiums) rather than
face the risk of a large loss that is unlikely but possible.
Not all risks however, are insurable. Insurance experts have identiﬁed at least ﬁve ideal
conditions for a risk to be considered insurable.
Determinable and Measurable Loss. It must be possible to determine clearly when a
loss has occurred and the magnitude of the loss.
Accidental and Unintentional Loss. Indemnities should only be paid when a loss has
occurred due to a random event over which the insured has little or no control.
Calculable Expected Frequency and Magnitude of Loss. To develop a premium rate,
the insurer must be able to estimate accurately both the expected frequency and ex-
pected severity of loss.
Potential Insureds Can Be Accurately Classiﬁed. Potential insureds need to be reli-
ably classiﬁed into separate risk pools that reﬂects relative risk and avoids adverse
selection problems.
Large Number of Independent Exposure Units. The variance in returns on the in-
surer’s portfolio can be reduced by diversifying over a large number of insurance poli-
cies if the indemnities paid on those policies are independent or, at least, not highly
positively correlated.
In reality, most insurance products deviate somewhat from these ideal conditions. How-
ever, violations of these ideal conditions must be recognized and addressed when insurance
products are being designed. Failure to do so may destroy the long-term viability of the
product. Risks characterized by extreme violations of these ideal insurability conditions are
likely not insurable.
45 Independent versus Correlated Risk
When considering the potential functionality of any risk transfer instrument, a major consid-
eration is the degree of correlation in ﬁnancial losses caused by the risk. Insurance is based on
the basic principles of diversiﬁcation. Aggregating uncorrelated risks into a single insurance
pool reduces the variance of loss. In other words, when considering a pool of uncorrelated
loss events, the mean of the individual variances is always greater than the variance around
the mean loss of the pool. This result follows from the statistical property known as the “law
of large numbers.” Society beneﬁts from insurance markets that pool uncorrelated risks since
the risk faced by the pool is less than the pre-aggregated sum of individual risks (Priest,
1996).
Agricultural production losses tend to be characterized by some degree of positive spatial
correlation. The degree of positive correlation is often inversely related to the size of the
region under consideration. Thus, relatively small (large) countries are likely characterized
by more (less) positively correlated agricultural losses. Positive spatial-correlation in losses
limits the risk reduction that can be obtained by pooling risks from diﬀerent geographical
areas. This increases the variance in indemnities paid by insurers. As a result, it also increases
the cost of maintaining adequate reserves or reinsurance to fund potentially large indemnities
caused by systemic loss events. In general, the more that losses are positively correlated the
less eﬃcient insurance is as a risk transfer mechanism.
Other risk transfer markets are better suited for risks that are highly positively correlated.
For example, well-developed futures exchange markets exist for sharing risks associated with
commodity prices, interest rates, and exchange rates. In recent years, various capital market
instruments have developed for transferring highly correlated weather risks or risks associated
with natural disasters.
In general, agricultural production losses are typically neither uncorrelated nor highly
positively correlated. They are what we have referred to elsewhere as “in-between” risks
(Skees and Barnett, 1999). This implies that, if used exclusively, neither insurance nor capital
market instruments are well-suited to transferring agricultural production risks. However,
a careful blending of these instruments can foster further development of agricultural risk
transfer opportunities. This implies an important and appropriate role for governments in
developing countries.
56 Implications for Agricultural Insurance
Based on the previous discussion of agricultural risks, risk management strategies, and insur-
ability conditions, one can draw a number of implications for agricultural insurance products.
￿ Relative risk varies by crop and region and these diﬀerences in relative risk must be
reﬂected in insurance premium rates. Failure to do so will create inequities among
insureds and ineﬃcient allocation of resources.
￿ Agricultural producers employ many diﬀerent risk management strategies. Insurance
products should be developed so as to complement eﬀective existing risk management
strategies.
￿ Risk management is always costly.
￿ Not all perils are insurable.
￿ For perils that are potentially insurable, insurance products should be tailored to
address the risk characteristics of the peril.
￿ Because agricultural producers employ many diﬀerent risk management strategies,
some producers will not want (or need) insurance.
￿ When developing insurance products one must be aware of the potential for adverse
selection. Eﬀective risk classiﬁcation (sometimes called “underwriting”) is critical to
the long-term success of insurance products.
￿ When developing insurance products one must be aware of the potential for moral
hazard. It is critical that insured producers not be able to engage in activities that
increase the likelihood or magnitude of indemnity payments.
￿ When developing insurance products, one must have suﬃcient data to calculate pre-
mium rates. The more uncertainty about the nature of the underlying risk, the more
that insurers will load premium rates.
￿ Insurance products are best suited to protecting against losses from independent perils.
Capital market instruments are best suited to protecting against losses from correlated
perils. When perils are neither completely independent nor completely correlated, some
combination of insurance and capital market instruments may be required.
6.1 Market Failure or Logical Market Response?
Is the lack of eﬀective private sector agricultural insurance markets the result of a market
failure, or is it simply a logical market outcome? High transactions costs preclude many
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For example, insurance products for high frequency, low magnitude losses are seldom oﬀered
because the transactions costs associated with loss adjustment would make the insurance
cost-prohibitive for most potential purchasers.
In general, farmers probably don’t need insurance that will cover high-frequency, low-
magnitude agricultural production losses. They use other risk management mechanisms to
cover these losses. They likely do need insurance that will protect against low-frequency,
high-magnitude loss events. However, research suggests that many decision-makers tend
to underestimate their exposure to low-frequency, high-magnitude losses. Thus, they are
unwilling to pay the full costs of an insurance product that would protect against these losses.
Those who do buy insurance against low-frequency, high-magnitude losses often cancel the
policy if they do not receive an indemnity for an extended period. Thus, it seems that, if
they are to be successful, agricultural insurance products must be constructed so they will
make indemnity payments at a reasonable frequency (say, 1-in-10 years).
The cognitive complexity and ambiguity surrounding any assessment of low-frequency,
high-magnitude events may merit some special considerations. Low-probability events, even
when severe, are frequently discounted or ignored altogether by producers trying to determine
the value of an insurance contract. This happens because forming probability assessments
over future events is complex and often entails high search costs. On the other side, insurers
will typically load premium rates heavily for low-frequency and high-magnitude events when
there is considerable ambiguity surrounding the actual likelihood of the event. Ambiguity is
especially serious when considering highly skewed probability distributions with long tails as
is typical of crop yields. Uncertainty is further compounded when the historical data used to
form empirical distributions are incomplete or of poor quality. Together, these eﬀects create
a wedge between the prices that farmers are willing to pay for catastrophic agricultural
insurance and the prices that insurers are willing to accept. Thus, functioning private-sector
markets fail to materialize or, if they do materialize, cover only a small portion of the overall
risk exposure.
This type of market failure is commonly used to justify government intervention to supply
products or services that are not provided (or not provided in suﬃcient quantity) by private
markets. However, the lack of a functioning private-sector agricultural insurance market is
not suﬃcient to justify government intervention. If governments are to intervene in agri-
cultural insurance markets, the social beneﬁts of reducing the ineﬃciencies brought on by
risk must outweigh the social cost of making agricultural insurance work. Asking if there is
true market failure is a critical ﬁrst step before governments embark upon what could be an
expensive proposition.
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fully diagnose the cause of the problem. Only then can one consider whether government
is better positioned to address the problem than private entities. For example, governments
may have no inherent advantage over markets in trying to facilitate the provision of indi-
vidual, farm-level, yield or revenue insurance products. These products are rarely provided
in the private-sector typically due to information asymmetries that cause moral hazard and
adverse selection problems. It is hard to see how a government provider would have any
inherent advantage in addressing these information asymmetries. Nor would government
provision contribute much to reducing the eﬀects of cognitive complexity that limit the de-
mand for agricultural insurance. On the supply side, government may have an impact in that
when setting premium rates it may be less sensitive than private insurers to risk ambiguity.
Asymmetric information, correlated loss risk, cognitive errors, and ambiguity, have all
contributed to the lack of private agricultural insurance markets in most countries. Govern-
ments have responded to the lack of private agricultural insurance markets by either directly
providing agricultural insurance or facilitating the provision of such insurance through pri-
vate market channels. But these government interventions have been very expensive which
begs the question of whether the costs of providing insurance outweigh the social costs of
the risk exposure.
The remainder of this manuscript addresses alternative models for government inter-
vention is agricultural insurance markets. The focus is on government facilitation of index
insurance products. Gains in cognitive recognition and a lessening of the ambiguity problem
may occur if the tail of the loss distribution - that segment containing the fewest obser-
vations, greatest uncertainty, and highest losses - can be layered out and transferred using
indexed insurance products. Doing so would remove much of the justiﬁcation for very high
ambiguity loads on insurance products that cover losses throughout the remainder of the
distribution.
7 Index Insurance Alternatives
Index insurance products are contingent claims contracts that are less susceptible to some
of the problems that plague multiple-peril, farm-level crop insurance products. With index
insurance products, payments are based on an independent measure that is highly correlated
with farm-level yield or revenue outcomes. Unlike traditional crop insurance that attempts
to measure individual farm yields or revenues, index insurance makes use of variables that
are exogenous to the individual policyholder—such as area-level yield, or some objective
weather event such as rainfall—but have a strong correlation to farm-level losses.
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exposure unit be uncorrelated (Rejda, 2001). For index insurance, a precondition is that risk
be spatially correlated. When yield losses are spatially correlated, index insurance contracts
can be an eﬀective alternative to traditional farm-level crop insurance.
Because it protects against spatially correlated losses, index insurance facilitates risk trad-
ing locally among individuals who may expect to experience diﬀerent levels of loss when the
underlying loss event occurs. Index products also facilitate trading in more formal ﬁnancial
markets where investors may hold index contracts as another investment in a diversiﬁed port-
folio. In fact, index contracts may oﬀer signiﬁcant diversiﬁcation beneﬁts since the returns
should be generally uncorrelated with returns from traditional debt and equity markets.
7.1 Relative Advantages and Disadvantages of Index Insurance
Traditional, multiple-peril crop insurance is often sold only with large deductibles. Because of
this, index insurance can sometimes oﬀer superior risk protection compared to multiple-peril
crop insurance. Deductibles, co-payments, or other partial payments for loss are commonly
used by insurance providers to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Asym-
metric information problems are much lower with index insurance because 1) a producer has
little more information than the insurer regarding the index value, and 2) individual produc-
ers are generally unable to inﬂuence the index value. This characteristic of index insurance
means there is less need for deductibles and co-payments. Similarly, unlike traditional in-
surance, there is little reason to place restrictions on the amount of coverage an individual
purchases. As long as the individual farmer cannot inﬂuence the realized value of the index,
there is no need to restrict liability. An exception occurs when governments oﬀer premium
subsidies as a percentage of premium. In this case, they may want to restrict liability (and
thus, premium) to limit the amount of subsidy paid to a given policyholder.
Index contracts oﬀer numerous advantages over more traditional forms of farm-level
multiple-peril crop insurance. These advantages include:
Less moral hazard. Moral hazard arises with traditional insurance when insured parties
can alter their behavior so as to increase the potential likelihood or magnitude of a
loss. This is less possible with index insurance because the indemnity does not depend
on the individual producer’s realized yield.
Less adverse selection. Adverse selection is a misclassiﬁcation problem caused by asym-
metric information. If the potential insured has better information than the insurer
about the potential likelihood or magnitude of a loss, the potential insured can use
that information to self-select whether or not to purchase insurance. Index insurance,
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tional asymmetries to be exploited.
Lower administrative costs. Unlike farm-level multiple-peril crop insurance policies, in-
dex insurance products do not require underwriting and inspections of individual farms.
Indemnities are paid solely on the realized value of the underlying index as measured
by government agencies or other third parties.
Standardized and transparent structure. Index insurance policies can be sold in var-
ious denominations as simple certiﬁcates with a structure that is uniform across un-
derlying indexes. The terms of the contracts would therefore be relatively easy for
purchasers to understand.
Availability and negotiability. Since they are standardized and transparent, index in-
surance policies can easily be traded in secondary markets. Such markets would create
liquidity and allow policies to ﬂow where they are most highly valued. Individuals could
buy or sell policies as the realization of the underlying index begins to unfold. Moreover,
the contracts could be made available to a wide variety of parties, including farmers,
agricultural lenders, traders, processors, input suppliers, shopkeepers, consumers, and
agricultural workers.
Reinsurance function. Index insurance can be used to transfer the risk of widespread cor-
related agricultural production losses. Thus, it can be used as a mechanism to reinsure
insurance company portfolios of farm-level insurance policies. Index insurance instru-
ments allow farm-level insurers to transfer their exposure to undiversiﬁable correlated
loss risk while retaining the residual risk that is idiosyncratic and diversiﬁable (Black
et al., 1999).
There are also challenges that must be addressed if index insurance markets are to be
successful. These include:
Basis risk. The occurrence of basis risk depends on the extent to which the insured’s losses
are positively correlated with the index. Without suﬃcient correlation, basis risk be-
comes too severe, and index insurance is not an eﬀective risk management tool. Careful
design of index insurance policy parameters (coverage period, trigger, measurement
site, etc.) can help reduce basis risk. Selling the index insurance to microﬁnance or
other collective groups can also pass the issue of basis risk to a local group that can
develop mutual insurance at some level. Such a group is in the best position to know
their neighbors and determine how to allocate index insurance payments within the
group.
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critically on the underlying index being objectively and accurately measured. The in-
dex measurements must then be made widely available in a timely manner. Whether
provided by governments or other third party sources, index measurements must be
widely disseminated and secure from tampering. Possible approaches for mitigating
potential problems with the weather data include 1) more secure, tamper-proof sta-
tions and instruments, and 2) veriﬁcation of measurements using comparisons with
adjacent stations or with remote sensing data.
Precise actuarial modeling. Insurers will not sell index insurance products unless they
can understand the statistical properties of the underlying index. This requires both
suﬃcient historical data on the index, and actuarial models that use these data to
predict the likelihood of various index measures.
Education. Index insurance policies are typically much simpler than traditional farm-level
insurance policies. However, since the policies are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than tradi-
tional insurance policies, some education is generally required to help potential users
assess whether or not index insurance instruments can provide them with eﬀective
risk management. Insurers and/or government agencies can help by providing training
strategies and materials not only for farmers, but also for other potential users such
as bankers and agribusinesses.
Marketing. A marketing plan must be developed that addresses how, when, and where in-
dex insurance policies are to be sold. Also, the government and other involved institu-
tions must consider whether to allow secondary markets in index insurance instruments
and, if so, how to facilitate and regulate those markets.
Reinsurance. In most transition economies, insurance companies do not have the ﬁnan-
cial resources to oﬀer index insurance without adequate and aﬀordable reinsurance.
Eﬀective arrangements must therefore be forged between local insurers, international
reinsurers, national governments, and possibly international development organiza-
tions. The insurer faces high risk because of the covariant nature of the insured risk.
When a payment is due, then all those who have purchased insurance against the same
weather station must be paid at the same time. Moreover, if the insured risks at dif-
ferent weather stations are highly correlated, then the insurer faces the possibility of
having to make huge payments in the same year. To hedge against this risk, the in-
surer can either diversify regionally by selecting weather stations and risks that are not
highly (positively) correlated, or sell part of the risk to the international reinsurance
and ﬁnancial markets.
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could be too small to be proﬁtable. The insurance will only appeal to people whose
economic losses are highly correlated with the insured weather event. If the index
does not suﬃciently approximate actual loss experiences then the insurance will not
sell. Also, if the probability of loss is high, then the cost of the insurance could be
prohibitive. To overcome these problems, the insurance might be limited only to truly
catastrophic events that though infrequent, impose large losses. Collective action by
agricultural cooperatives, microﬁnance groups, or farmer associations, oﬀers signiﬁcant
promise for the use of index contracts and adds value by developing mutual insurance
products whereby members have a vested interest in mitigating fraudulent behavior.
Weather Cycles. The actuarial soundness of the insurance could be undermined by weather
cycles that change the probability of the insured events. It may be necessary to adjust
the cost of the insurance whenever a speciﬁc weather event is conﬁrmed, though this
would require suﬃcient lead time between knowledge of the pending event and the
time of selling insurance
As more sophisticated systems are developed to measure events that cause widespread prob-
lems (such as satellite imagery) it is possible that indexing major events will be more
straightforward and accepted by international capital markets. Under these conditions, it
may become possible to oﬀer insurance in countries that traditional reinsurers and primary
providers would previously have never considered. Insurance is about trust. New risk man-
agement opportunities can develop if relevant, reliable, and trustworthy, indexes can be
constructed.
The value of index insurance is enhanced when it is blended with banking and credit
services. The role of index insurance is to manage the correlated risk of widespread crop
losses by shifting it to those willing and better able to assume those risks, generally ﬁnancial
and reinsurance markets. In turn, the local banking sector should be able to work with
individual producers to help them manage idiosyncratic and basis risk; if a producer has an
independent loss when the index insurance does not pay, it should be possible to borrow
from the bank to smooth that shock. By combining insurance with banking in this manner,
it is possible to remove one of the main concerns associated with index insurance: a producer
may not receive payment when a loss is realized.
In principle, one might expect the private sector to take the initiative in developing
weather-based insurance, but it would be advantageous for governments to:
￿ identify key catastrophic weather events that correlate strongly with agricultural pro-
duction and income in diﬀerent types of agricultural regions;
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￿ ensure secure weather stations;
￿ establish an appropriate legal and regulatory framework for weather insurance; and,
￿ underwrite the insurance in some way (perhaps through contingent loans) until a suf-
ﬁcient volume of business has been established that international reinsurers or banks
are willing to come in and assume the underwriting role for themselves.
7.1.1 Reinsurance and Weather Markets
Much can be said about the international reinsurance community and their resistance to
entering new and untested markets. The use of capital markets for sharing “in-between”
risks remains in the infant stage, leaving the issue of capacity and eﬃciency in doubt. This
raises questions about the role of government in sharing such risk. For the United States,
Lewis and Murdock (1996) recommend government catastrophic options that are auctioned
to reinsurers. Part of the thinking is that the government has adequate capital to back stop
such options and may be less likely to load these options as much as the reinsurance market.
Skees and Barnett (1999) write about the role of government oﬀering insurance options for
catastrophes as a means of getting aﬀordable capital into the market. However, the demand
for catastrophic insurance will be limited where free disaster assistance is available.
Reinsurers have acquired many of the professionals who were trading weather. SwissRE
acquired professionals from Enron and PartnerRE, and ACE acquired professionals from
Aquila. Reinsurers are now in a position to oﬀer reinsurance using weather-based indexes.
This type of reinsurance should be more aﬀordable since it is not subject to traditional
adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
7.1.2 Mitigating Basis Risk with Market Solutions
Weather-index insurance products should only be used when there are speciﬁc weather events
that create signiﬁcant crop failures. Under these conditions, weather index insurance prod-
ucts will remove most catastrophic risks that involve correlated losses and present a major
challenge for private sector ﬁnancing of these types of losses. Once a weather index insurance
product removes the largest risk, a host of private market eﬀorts can be used to mitigate
the basis risk. These eﬀorts can be classiﬁed as follows:
￿ Self-retention of smaller basis risk by the farmer
￿ Supplemental products underwritten by private insurers
13￿ Blending index insurance and rural ﬁnance
– Indemnity payments could be used to forgive debt,
– Indemnity payments could be used to facilitate a form of mutual insurance,
– Indemnity payments could be used to facilitate better terms of credit.
7.2 Where Weather Index Insurance Is Inappropriate
Weather index insurance contracts will not work well for all agricultural producers. There
are many places in the world where agricultural commodities are grown in micro-climates.
For example, much of the coﬀee in the world is grown up and down the sides of small and
large mountains. Fruit such as apples and cherries will also be commonly grown in areas that
can have very large diﬀerences in weather patterns within a few miles. In highly spatially
heterogeneous production areas, basis risk will likely be so high as to make index insurance
problematic. Under these conditions, index insurance will work only if it is highly localized
and/or if it can be written so that it protects only against the most extreme loss events.
Some regions of the world also have strong negative trends in variables (such as precip-
itation) that could potentially be used as the basis of an index. This negative trend can
compound both the complexity of index insurance products and the potential mistakes that
can be made in writing these oﬀers. There are also signiﬁcant crop production regions in the
world that suﬀer from frequent and signiﬁcant droughts (e.g., 1-in-3, or 1-in-5 years). Even
under the best of circumstances, it is diﬃcult to envision creating a sustainable index insur-
ance product given such frequent and signiﬁcant crop failures. Other solutions are needed in
these circumstances.
Over-ﬁtting the data is another concern with index insurance. If one has a limited amount
of crop yield data, ﬁtting the statistical relationship between the index and that limited
data can become problematic. Small sample sizes and ﬁtting regressions within sample can
lead to complex contract designs that may or may not be eﬀective hedging mechanisms
for individual farmers. Typical procedures that assume liner relationships simply may be
the wrong models to use. Extreme events that are generally accepted by a wide range of
decision makers as events that create large losses may oﬀer a better starting point. While
scientists are tempted to ﬁt complex relationships to crop patterns, interviews with farmers
may reveal more about what type of weather events concern them the most. When designing
a weather-index contract one may be tempted to focus on the relationship between weather
events and a single crop. When it fails to rain for an extended period of time, many crops
will be adversely impacted. Likewise, if it rains for an extended period of time and there is
14signiﬁcant cloud cover because of persistent rain during a critical photosynthesis period, a
number of crops will also be adversely impacted.
Finally, when designing index insurance contracts, signiﬁcant care must be taken to
assure that the insured has no better information about the likelihood and magnitude of
an indemnity than does the insurer. Endogenous forecasts of weather by farmers are many
times quite good. Potatoes farmers in Peru forecast El Ni˜ no better than many climate
experts. In 1988, a major company oﬀered drought insurance in the U.S. Midwest. As the
sales closing data neared, the company noted that farmers were increasing the purchase of
these contracts in a signiﬁcant fashion. Rather than recognize that these farmers had already
made a conditional forecast that the summer was going to be very dry, the company extended
the sales closing date and sold even more rainfall insurance contracts. The company had a
major failure and rainfall insurance for agriculture in the United States suﬀered a signiﬁcant
setback. The lesson learned is that if one is going to write insurance based on weather
events, it is critical to be diligent in following and understanding weather forecasts. Farmers
have a vested interest in understanding the weather and climate. Insurance providers who
venture into weather index insurance must know at least as much as the farmer about
conditional weather forecasts. Otherwise, adverse selection will render the index insurance
product unsustainable.
8 Developing Policy Prescriptions
Given the discussion above a few key points merit re-emphasis:1
￿ Cognitive failure is common for infrequent and severe natural disasters.
￿ Natural disasters involve correlated risks whereby many individuals can experience
large ﬁnancial losses at the same time.
￿ Monitoring individual farmer behavior involves high transaction costs and, without
proper consideration for incentive compatibility issues, government attempts to oﬀer
individual crop insurance should be avoided.
￿ Properly designed index insurance products can clear the way for other more eﬃcient
market-based solutions to handle idiosyncratic or basis risk.
1This section is developed using concepts that are similar to those being proposed for the Mongolian livestock
insurance pilot program. A number of individuals have been involved in the development of those recommen-
dations. From the World Bank insurance side, Rodney Lester and Olivier Mahul have provided signiﬁcant
input into these designs. Jerry Skees has been the primary consultant working with these professionals and
others involved in the Mongolian pilot program. Nathan Belete is the task manager and Richard Carpenter
is the legal consultant.
158.1 Layering Catastrophe Risk
To focus the discussion, Figure 1 presents the probability distribution function for August
rainfall in Andhra Pradesh, India. Figure 1 was developed using historic data from the
period 1871 to 2000 from the coastal region of Andra Pradesh using nonparametric kernel-
smoothing procedures that smooth out the long tail of the distribution. In reality there are
few observations above the 2,500 mm level. For sake of exposition, assume that rainfall in
excess of 2000 mm creates crop losses. A private insurance provider could write a contract
that would that would use 2000 mm as the strike and 2500 mm as the limit.2 It is common
for insurance providers to place limits on their exposure as they do not want open-ended
exposure for extreme rainfall events that represent true catastrophes. The index insurance
contract could be quite straightforward. The insured would select the amount of insurance
(the liability) and the payment rate per tick would be calculated as follows:




Assume that a farmer has a crop with an expected value of $15,000. Should rainfall reach
the 2500 mm level, it is estimated that the farmer will lose two-thirds of the value of the
crop. Thus, the farmer purchases $10,000 of liability and the payment rate for each tick
(each mm of rainfall) would be $20 ($10,000 divided by (2500-2000)). For example, at 250
ticks (or 2750 mm of rainfall) the indemnity would equal 250 x $20 = $5000.
The insurance provider has limited the losses beyond 2500 mm for this insurance product.
Without setting this limit, the contract would be extremely expensive since it would protect
against losses in the extreme upper tail of the probability distribution. Because there are few
empirical observations in this upper tail of the distribution, insurance sellers would say that
the “ambiguity” is quite high. If an insurance product were to cover events in this upper
tail of the distribution, the premium would be heavily loaded for this ambiguity. On the
other hand, buyers are more likely to experience cognitive failure regarding events in the
extreme upper tail of the distribution. Thus the wedge between sellers’ willingness to accept
and buyers’ willingness to pay is largest for insurance that covers extreme events in the tail
of the distribution. As a result, markets will often fail to transfer socially optimal amounts
of risk in the extreme tails of probability distributions.
The story of layering risk does not end here. Even if a local insurance company oﬀers a
number of “layered” rainfall insurance contracts in the region in such a fashion that each
one has a limited exposure, the portfolio of these contracts would very likely have a long tail
2The example could just as easily focus on shortfalls of rainfall. However, in this case, the purpose of the
limit is clear. The lower bound on rainfall is zero. The upper bound on rainfall is unknown.
16of extreme losses. This is relatively easy to understand given that extreme rainfall in even
an expanded region would likely be highly correlated—if the rainfall is close to 2500 mm in
Andhra Pradesh, it is likely to be very high in a number of states in that area. To illustrate
this point, an estimate of the loss function for the reinsured companies selling crop insurance
in the United States is presented in Figure 2.3 This distribution suggests that a company
with a national book of crop insurance and the beneﬁts of the U.S. standard reinsurance
agreement could still suﬀer losses in excess of premiums. More speciﬁcally, the distribution
indicates that the company could lose more than the premium approximately 13 percent of
the time. Without the beneﬁts of the special reinsurance agreement, the level and severity
of net losses would be much higher.
The loss function presented in Figure 2 is very typical of any insurance product that
attempts to insure against losses that are correlated. Once again, layering the risk of the
losses is a critical means of ﬁnancing these large losses. Reinsurance is used to accomplish
this task. The easiest way to consider the role of reinsurance is to consider that the insurer
of events that create a loss function (as presented in Figure 2) would purchase insurance
on these losses. For example, insurers may decide that they could build adequate reserves
that would cover losses beyond 105 percent of premiums; however, they would be unable to
cover losses beyond that point. They could purchase what is called a “stop loss” contract to
3These are the authors’ estimates and include all of the very complex rules of the standard reinsurance
agreement in the United States. This agreement allows companies to select the business they wish to keep
and the business they wish to pass on to the government. In addition, the government oﬀers a stop loss
agreement for every state at the loss ratio of 500 percent.
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17pay for all losses beyond 105 percent of the premium. More complex arrangements allow for
quota shares, whereby the local insurance provider shares both premiums and losses with a
global reinsurance market.
Just as with any insurance product, one can estimate the premium rates of a simple stop
loss on the insurance losses using the information in Figure 2. The area above the stop loss
is the ﬁrst estimate for such reinsurance. Thus, as one works to sell more contracts across
a wider region (i.e., a more diversiﬁed portfolio), the area above the stop loss will become
smaller. However, as a company expands into new areas and new products, the likelihood of
making mistakes may also increase. For that reason, concentrating in known markets may
be a good strategy at some level. Still, the more concentrated the portfolio of the insurance
company, the more skewed the loss function (i.e., there is both a higher likelihood and
severity of large ﬁnancial losses).
With index insurance it may be that pooling losses among a number of insurance com-
panies within a country can oﬀer diversiﬁcation beneﬁts to companies that sell policies only
in limited areas. However, insurance companies would be ill-advised to pool more tradi-
tional insurance contracts without excellent knowledge of the underwriting companies and
their actuarial procedures. With relatively standard index insurance contracts, this type of
concern is lessened considerably, making pooling among insurance companies a much easier
proposition. Nonetheless, rules for pooling and some government involvement may be needed
to facilitate this activity.
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188.2 Structured Disaster Response to Complement Private
Products
Given that ambiguity loading and cognitive failure are more problematic for extreme tail
risk, governments and non-government organizations (NGOs) could be involved in facilitat-
ing transfers of these risks through appropriate layering of index insurance contracts. Such
systems could be designed for either put option risk (e.g., severe shortfalls in the underlying
index) or call option risk (e.g., severe excesses in the underlying index). A key would be to
make certain that the transfers do not involve risks that are more frequent. If such risks are
removed without the individual bearing some cost, the cognitive failure argument breaks
down and one can imagine that the same problem of undue risk-taking in more risky regions
will become a concern (Milete, 1999).
Returning to the example in Figure 1, the government could design a structured disaster
response product (DRP) that would pay for losses beyond the 2500 mm level. The indemnity
structure could be the same as that used for the insurance product that protects against
losses in the layer between 2000 and 2500 mm. Government could select the thresholds for
the DRP, based upon statistical properties. The idea would be to select thresholds likely
to be in the realm of cognitive failure. The approach should attempt to develop thresholds
that reﬂect relatively rare events (e.g. at least 1-in-15 years). Furthermore, as more advanced
statistical methods are developed with the data, one can imagine government attempting
to set the thresholds and payout rules so that the implicit transfer is roughly equal across
diﬀerent regions. This would be more equitable and create fewer incentives for taking on
more risk in higher risk regions.
Simple rules that encourage farmers to purchase the insurance product for the 2000–2500
mm layer can be considered. For example, if farmers select only to sign up for the DRP, they
should be required to pay a relatively small administrative fee. If they purchase the insurance
for the 2000–2500 layer, they could be given the DRP for free. Such a tie would reduce the
problems associated with government disaster programs that crowd-out private insurance
products (PIP).
For the case in Figure 1, there would be three layers of risk and three diﬀerent entities
involved in holding these risks:
1. For rainfall below 2000, farmers would retain the risk either on their own or with other
bank and non-bank entities.
2. For rainfall between 2000–2500, the risk would ﬁrst be transferred to a local insurance
19company via a private insurance product (PIP).4
3. For rainfall levels above 2500, the government would provide insurance with the disaster
response product (DRP).
The example can be generalized. Let x be a measure of the loss needed to be hedged and
let f(x) be the probability density function of claims in an individual region. The payment
functions for three decompositions can be represented by a truncated function. Strike is the
attachment point of the contract, i.e., the point on the index at which indemnity payments
would begin. Cap is the maximum limit of the insurer’s liability. The Cap greatly reduces
the insurers’ exposure to catastrophic losses.
If x < Strike, the loss is retained by the individuals or communities.
If Strike ≤ x ≤ Cap, the losses are protected by the local insurance company.
If x > Cap, the insurer pays an indemnity that is equal to the full liability and claims
in excess of Cap are paid by the disaster response product provided by the government.
A major motivation for this arrangement is that the extreme risk at the local level is taken
on by the government. Many proposals would have the government removing the extreme
risk only after the insurance has been pooled, as with the U.S. standard reinsurance agree-
ment. The arrangement proposed here would institutionalize the social role of government in
removing extreme risk events at the local level. This would signiﬁcantly lower premium rates
as the tail risk, characterized by high ambiguity, would not need to be priced. Furthermore,
by organizing these types of contracts at the local level, isolated severe events that do not
capture the attention of the national policymakers could still have some structured assis-
tance in the form of a structured disaster response. Again, only infrequent-high consequence
risks should be included in any DRP design.5
To summarize the major advantages of oﬀering a structured DRP that uses weather index
contracts:
￿ Structured rules allow for better planning than ad hoc disaster payments;
4Even though the local insurance company provides the PIP, it is very likely that it will still have to use
other means to transfer the tail risk associated with selling a concentrated portfolio of correlated risk.
5One can also envision using the government to facilitate better pricing for these extreme tail risks. Lewis
and Murdoch (1996) and Skees and Barnett (1999) write about this solution. The problem is that writing
these contracts at a local level and attempting to provide support via auctions that are supported by
government would involve very high transaction costs.With discipline, the government can provide this layer
at a local level at a nominal fee and facilitate the development of base insurance products that complement
the mid-layer of risk.
20￿ Structured rules can account for low probability events explicitly, attempting to address
the ambiguity loading and cognitive failure problem, and provide for a structure that
provides more equity in expected payouts;
￿ Governments can set Cap levels and rules that complement the development of private
insurance products;
￿ Governments can estimate their own exposure associated with the DRP, and plan for
the ﬁscal costs accordingly;
￿ Having localized DRPs can provide for some level of catastrophic protection when
events are not widespread enough to command national attention that results in ad
hoc disaster payments.
8.3 Pooling the Risk Within the Country
Even with a layered PIP as developed above, there will be insurance loss functions that are at
least as skewed as the one in Figure 2. The correlated risk problem remains a constraint for
domestic insurance companies wanting to write PIPs. Nonetheless, international reinsurers
may still be more willing to oﬀer reinsurance to a local company oﬀering index insurance
because there are less asymmetric information problems (i.e., moral hazard and adverse
selection should be lower).
One ﬁnal role for government could be to develop the regulatory structure to allow
companies selling PIPs to pool their contracts within the country ﬁrst before going to the
global market. Such activity would make index insurance contracts more aﬀordable as the
tail of the loss distribution would be less formidable than it would be for any individual
insurance company that was unable to diversify its portfolio. Numerous structures can be
envisioned to facilitate pooling index insurance contracts among insurance companies. Again,
to the extent that the contracts have used information that is of similar quality and have also
used similar procedures for rate-making, insurance companies should be able to pool these
risks without the same concerns that they would have if pooling more complex insurance
products subject to moral hazard and adverse selection.
One structure could be to create a syndicate relationship among insurance providers.
Each could deposit the premiums into the pool. They could arrange to have a stop loss
on the pool either from government or from a major reinsurer. For example, if they chose
to purchase a stop loss of 110 percent of all premiums, they would receive the beneﬁts of
pooling by having a lower reinsurance premium rate than they could obtain on their own if
they went to the reinsurance market. The simple fact that the companies worked together
21to aggregate a signiﬁcant volume of risk would also enhance their chances of getting an
international reinsurer interested in the business.
To elaborate on a structure that could be implemented, each insurance company would
be required to pay reinsurance that was consistent with the proﬁle of risk they bring into the
pool. They would also be required to estimate the total premium they would sell. Thus, the
insurance companies who participate would prepay an amount equal to the stop loss layer
(10 percent in this case) and the reinsurance cost for the business they anticipate bringing
into the pool. The pool would purchase the reinsurance stop loss from either the government
or the global reinsurance market. Once the reinsurance is purchased, the beneﬁts of pooling
could be passed on to each insurance provider via discounted reinsurance premiums to the
pool. The idea would be to leave enough premium in the pool (110 percent in this case) to
fully pay for all indemnities. Once the insurance cycle is complete, the underwriting gains
would be distributed to each participating insurance provider, based on their share of the
premiums sold. Of course, the pool would also earn interest over the insurance cycle. Thus,
there would always be something to share at the end of the insurance cycle, even if losses
exceeded the 110 percent level.
Again, the concept of layering risk can be used for this pooling arrangement. Governments
may decide that they wish to spur the insurance market. They could oﬀer a layer of stop loss
reinsurance at a pure premium rate that would be signiﬁcantly lower than the premium rate
charged by the global reinsurance ﬁrms. For example, they could oﬀer the pool a stop loss
at 130 percent. This would eﬀectively make the insurance to the end user more aﬀordable
and be a superior way to introduce a subsidy, as it would again be working with extreme,
catastrophe-type risk. If the government oﬀered a stop loss at 130 percent, the pool would
still likely need to go to the global market to obtain a stop loss at a lower level.
The real advantage of the pooling arrangement for these standardized index insurance
contracts is that the individual insurance company’s share in the pooling arrangement could
be treated as an asset. If a company had a 25 percent share in a pool, that share could
ultimately be sold to any other member of the consortium or to a global reinsurer. For
example, an easy arrangement would be to have a 50/50 percent sharing between the local
company and a global reinsurer (this is similar to a quota share). More fundamentally, one
could envision an exchange-traded market emerging to dynamically trade shares of the pool
as the crop year progresses. Such an arrangement should result in more eﬃcient pricing.
The other strong advantage of the pooling arrangement just described is that it would
guarantee farmers would be paid for losses but with far less regulation than what is often
required to assure that insurance companies have the ﬁnancial wherewithal to pay indem-
nities. Companies would eﬀectively be prepaying for losses below the stop loss. The major
22concern would be to assure that the reinsurance above the stop loss would be fully protected.
9 Conclusions and Implications
Insurance for natural hazard risk is indeed complex. For this reason, government involve-
ment to facilitate markets for crop insurance has typically been unsuccessful and/or quite
expensive. This paper has reviewed some of the problems with attempts to provide crop
insurance in the United States and Canada. The problems of correlated risks, cognitive fail-
ure, and high transaction costs have been introduced to explain why true markets for these
risks have not emerged. Index insurance products oﬀer some hope for dealing with problems
associated with monitoring and high transaction costs to mitigate moral hazard and adverse
selection problems that plague traditional multiple-peril crop insurance. However, as was
discussed, one must still consider further developments and other institutional arrangements
to mitigate the basis risk that may accompany index insurance products.
More work is still needed on the basis risk in index insurance products. The conceptual
thinking to date focuses on the use of risk aggregators who could, in turn, develop both formal
and informal mechanisms for addressing basis risk. These mechanisms may involve mutual
insurance companies. They might also involve banks that oﬀer contingent loans to individual
who suﬀer hardships when the index insurance does not pay. The notion of blending index
insurance with lending instruments merits more serious consideration. Once again, banks
should be well suited to handle small event risks that are generally associated with basis
risk.
Numerous innovations can emerge from the concepts associated with index insurance. For
example, ongoing work in Mexico examines the extent to which index insurance contracts
can be used to hedge the inﬂow of water from the stream that feeds an irrigation reservoir.
This could be a quite important means of using both engineering solutions and market-based
solutions to plan for the size of dams and the rules for allocating water. The conceptual goal is
to have contracts with water users that guarantee either water delivery or some combination
of water and indemnity payments when the water is not available (Skees and Zeuli, 1999).
Such capital market solutions could accelerate the movement towards more eﬃcient water
markets in many developing countries.
We close with speciﬁc policy recommendations that build on the use of weather index
insurance. The recommendations presented earlier explicitly recognize the social goals of
government to cover extreme catastrophic events via what is termed a Disaster Response
Product (DRP). This approach provides structure to disaster response in a fashion that
should not create signiﬁcant market distortions. It also explicitly recognizes that markets
23are expensive for extreme event risks and that decision makers are limited in their cognitive
assessment of these types of risks. Finally, the structure facilitates markets rather than
crowding them out.
Even with a DRP program, insurers of less extreme layers will still have a correlated
risk problem that can cause extreme losses for their portfolio of insurance products. To ad-
dress this problem Section 10 develops recommendations for a unique pooling arrangement
to retain as much risk within the country as possible before going to the international rein-
surance markets. Once such pooling arrangements have been organized, the consortium of
insurance companies who participate in the pool can more eﬀectively approach the global
reinsurance market for stop loss reinsurance coverage. Should governments decide they want
to provide more support for the overall insurance program; the government can also select
various stop loss levels to protect the catastrophic risk of the pooled risk. Government stop
loss reinsurance coverage could presumably be sold at something approaching an actuari-
ally fair premium rate. The ability to purchase this reinsurance coverage at premium rates
that are below market levels would allow insurance companies to discount their insurance
premium rates.
The concept of layering risk that is written on a standard measure, using the same
rate-making producers opens many possible avenues for securitizing weather risks. Some of
the ideas presented are only the beginning. Should the structure that is suggested prove
viable one can envision many possible ways to trade correlated risk dynamically; ultimately
improving the pricing and eﬃciency of a weather market that is currently underdeveloped
globally.
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